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Abstract: Amidst the global religious resurgence in the post-secular world, the field of international
relations finds itself unwilling or unable to situate religion back to theoretical paradigms subject
to the Westphalian–Enlightenment prejudice. Advocates of religion’s theoretical and empirical
significance often turn to religious soft power, a burgeoning theory that gradually becomes the
anchorage of discussion but still suffers from conceptual ambiguity and limited explanatory capacity.
This essay endeavors to fill in this lacuna by presenting the interdisciplinary attempt to integrate
soft power in IR with the three dimensions of power in sociology, which results in a typology of
performative, discursive, and relational dimensions of religious soft power. The explanatory and
predictive capacity of this model is tested in the empirical case of the evangelical group’s influence
on US foreign policy of the post 9/11 Global War on Terror. A process-level historical account
based on archival sources furthers scholars’ knowledge of transnational religious actors’ ability
to seize both systematic transformations at the international level and contentious dynamics in
the domestic environment, which generates a reorientation in norms, identities, and values that
contributes to the outcome of foreign policy, thereby answering the un-addressed question of how
religion influences domestic and international politics. The bridging of IR, sociology, and historical
sociology, three fields often intertwined, suggests a future direction for not only the religious return
to IR but also the overcoming of the “intellectual autism” of this discipline, which needs to be better
prepared for continuous challenges of soaring populism, nationalism, and clash of civilizations in the
twenty-first century.
Keywords: religions; international relations; soft power; evangelical; US foreign policy; political
sociology
1. Introduction
On 30 August 2021, US troops completed the comprehensive withdrawal from
Afghanistan, adding the final nail to the coffin of twenty years’ war with the Islamist
Taliban, who had reseized power two weeks prior. Underpinning the longest war on
foreign soil in American history are century-long interactions and conflicts between secular
and religious actors across the world. The secular/modern international relation owed its
evolution to the Christian Protestant Reformation, which redefined the locus of political
and economic authority and presented the new possibility of the state capacity in the west-
ern hemisphere. From the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1978–1979) to various ethnoreligious
conflicts within former Yugoslavia (1991–2001) to the two-decade US Global War on Terror
since 9/11, religion goes beyond the domestic level and transcends geographical, spatial,
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and cultural borders with wide-reaching and diverse impacts on world politics. Global-
ization, populism, and nationalism characterizing the twenty-first century further reflect
on the church–state binary and bring forward the “post-secular international relation”,
which both contextualizes and facilitates the worldwide resurgence of religion, elevating it
to a novel plane of significance (Haynes 2021; Toft et al. 2011; Thomas 2005). A concept
“older than the state [with] its aims encompass[ing] not just politics but all of life”, religion
remains central to policy making and is long perceived as “one of the basic forces of the
social universe” (Snyder 2011, p. 1; Shah and Philpott 2011, p. 24).
Surprisingly, contrary to the support it receives among politicians, the “return” and
“come back” of religion spark only a tepid response among scholars of international
relations (IR). A field privileging nation states as the sole unit of analysis and major foci
of attention under the Westphalian worldview, IR stays vigilant against the “discover”
and “rediscover” of faith-based organizations (FBOs) and individuals accompanying the
global religious revival, which challenges states’ monopoly of violence and decision-
making procedure at both domestic and international levels (Haynes 2013; Thomas 2005;
Philpott 2002; Berger 1999; Kulska 2020). Further exacerbating this Westphalian prejudice
was the Enlightenment assumption embedded in the social sciences, which uphold the
teleological assumption of modernization and consistently proclaim irreconcilable barriers
between the superior secular sector and the primordial religion, the antithesis of human
rationality comprised of nothing but “myths” (Cavanaugh 2009), “fairytales” (Thomas
2005), and “legends” (Barnett 2015). While scholars attempt to transfer the secular–religious
dichotomy into the novel diverse symbiosis ranging from international political theology
(IPT), religious soft power, to the socially and historically constructed secular division,
stigmatization and infantilization continue to loom over the literature on religious actors in
armed conflicts, peacebuilding, and international development (Appleby 2000; Kubálková
2000, 2003; Mandaville and Hamid 2018; Haynes 2021). The explicit reductivist perception
prevails among ongoing debates on whether religion manifests as a power of virtue or evil,
thereby oversimplifying this distinctive factor as either an iconoclastic free-rider irrelevant
to the international order or an explicit outlier incompatible with the world that deserves
being disregarded. Consequently, the predatory “ontological injustice” puts religion into
a paradoxical scenario. Albeit “stand[ing] at the center of international politics”, it is
“barely consider[ed] by realism, liberalism, and constructivism in their analysis of political
subjects” (Toft et al. 2011; Snyder 2011; Wilson 2017). The intriguing question remains:
how can religion interact with and affect the outcome of international relations? How
should scholars relocate marginalized and overlooked religion squarely into conventional
IR theoretical paradigms? What adaptations and innovations should the IR discipline make
in response to the global religious resurgence in a post-secular world?
This essay examines this question in the context of a popular yet often undertheo-
rized concept: religious soft power. The existing literature pioneered by Haynes (2010)
emphasizes the role of transnational religious actors in shaping the identity, values, and
norms of their global audience, which influence national foreign policy and are central to
the reinforcement or dysfunction of the existing international system (Jödicke 2018; Öztürk
2020, 2021; Mandaville and Hamid 2018; Steiner 2011, 2016; Ciftci and Tezcür 2016; Haynes
2010). Despite being the “most currently influential approach to the topic”, religious soft
power is often criticized for its ambiguity and the underexamined religion–power rela-
tion (Kearn 2011; Haynes 2021). To fill in this theoretical and empirical lacuna, this essay
expands the current literature and proposes a multidisciplinary crosscut between IR and
political sociology to further scrutinize and conceptualize the performative, discursive,
and relational dimensions of the single source of religious soft power under Reed’s (2013)
and Mann’s (1992, 1993) classic typology of the source of power. It commits to present an
analytical model to enumerate motivations, mechanisms, and circumstances experienced
by transnational religious actors, which are often marginalized and excluded from the
international norm/rule-making procedure. Through the constructivist lens, this essay
integrates literature on soft power, international norm, and sociological theories and exam-
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ines the schema of three-dimensional religious soft power by applying the process-tracing
method to the empirical case of faith-based evangelical US foreign policy in the post 9/11
Bush administration. The finding suggests that conservative evangelical groups’ manufac-
tured reality of the clash of religion and civilization, infiltration into political systems, and
localization and politicization of top-down religious messages correspond to the discur-
sive, performative, and relational dimension of the religious soft power obtained by the
evangelicals, who seized the Grotian moment to inject their identity, ideology, and interests
into US foreign policies on international human rights and the Global War on Terror.
This typology contributes to the project of power by recalibrating a model to integrate
systematic shifts on the international level with the process-level ideological reorientations
and political cleavages on the domestic level, all of which facilitate the creation of the
new language of religion that transfers religious actors’ perception of their identity, stakes,
values, and issues of competition. It brings forward the three-fold contributions. Empir-
ically, this detailed account brings forward multilingual and multi-archival evidence on
evangelical groups’ economic, military, and political operations behind the US Global War
on Terror. Theoretically, the enrichment and diversification of power, a concept embraced
by realism, liberalism, and constructivism with different priorities, provides a solution to
position religion back to the IR discipline (Gallarotti 2010). Without the ambition to propose
a complete synthesis among these major paradigms, the three-dimensional religious soft
power indeed foregrounds the potential for the refinement of, communications among, and
even integration of different theoretical frameworks. Moreover, religion as both a political
and social factor renders the interdisciplinary attempt a necessary move to overcome the
theoretical insufficiency of IR, which stubbornly upholds theoretical autonomy and rigid
“academic division of labor” with comparative politics, leaving the discrepancy between
our comprehension of international and domestic politics (Caporaso 1997). Integration of
IR and political sociology not only explores the balance between empiricism and rational-
ism from the macro perspective but also presents a potential approach to compare, contrast,
and coordinate levels of analysis, agents–structures binary, systematic theory, reductionism,
and other key methodologies on the micro-level (Han and Zhao 2018). Politically, as we
enter the third decade of the twenty-first century, which witnessed the emergence of reli-
gious essentialism and violent extremism, a deep dive into the transnational religious civil
society enables both scholars and policymakers to understand challenges and opportunities
associated with faith-based organizations’ material, normative, aspirational, and strategic
claims over global order and politics, thereby dismantling the oversimplified “religious
threat theory” in the era of “the clash of civilization” (Huntington 1996).
The examination of the three-dimensional religious soft power proceeds as follows.
This essay begins briefly by reviewing the state of the art of soft power and religious soft
power in the current IR literature. Addressing the theoretical and conceptual limitations,
it proceeds to investigate Reed’s source-of-power model and illustrates the performative,
discursive, and relational dimensions of religious soft power (Reed 2013, 2019). The third
section follows with an archive-based case study. The concluding section evaluates the
rigor and applicability of the theory at hand and suggests possible future research agendas
for scholars of IR, political sociology, and historical sociology.
2. Soft Power and Religious Soft Power in IR
First appearing in the work of Joseph Nye, Jr. (Nye 1991, 2002, 2003, 2004), soft
power is originally defined as nation states’ capacity for facilitating or preventing certain
actions of target actors with no coercive or material approach but only attraction, co-option,
and endearment (Gallarotti 2010). Contrary to conventional hard power, which either
raises the cost of incompliance with the use or threat to use military forces as a stick or
elevates the benefits of cooperation with economic resources and leverages as carrots, soft
power expands the foci of attention to both material and ideational factors, introducing
the alternative possibility of social pressure, status politics, and identity competition
encompassed within the co-opting mechanism (Mantilla 2017; Bower 2015; Towns 2012;
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Hathaway 2002; Chayes and Chayes 1993; Acharya 2018). There exist three major sources
of soft power: “the attractiveness of a country’s culture”, the achievement of its “political
values at home and abroad”, and the perception of its “foreign policies as legitimate
[with] moral authority” (Nye 2004, p. 11). It is difficult to overstate that soft power
falls most squarely into the constructivist framework. However, as Gallarotti (2010) and
Kearn (2011) accurately illustrate, the delicate integration of material interests, the key
priority of states striving for survival, interest seizure, and power augmentation under
the anarchic international system in the eyes of realists and liberal institutionalists, and
ideational factors including values, norms, identity, and social structures privileged by
constructivists, foregrounds soft power’s potential paradigmatic synthesis and contributes
to the increasing popularity and utility of this concept among IR scholars and politicians.
Among them are researchers striving to unravel religion’s influence on foreign policy and
for international politics to admit the global religious renaissance.
It is precisely within the purview of the post-secular turn of IR that emerges the
novel concept of religious soft power, which witnesses both the “thinning”, fading, and
“increasing porousness” of national boundaries and the rise of transnational civil society
out of cultural globalization, whose spill-over effect accounts for increasing dissemination
and attractiveness of both material and ideational factors of the religiosity (Rudolph
2005; Toft et al. 2011; Barbato and Kratochwil 2009). Given its capacity to constitute
and shape the culture, identity, attitudes, and policy preference of both religious groups
and nation states, religion soon comes under the spotlight and is recognized as a novel
and significant form and/or resource of soft power. The diversification of actors and
currencies of power in international affairs prepares scholars pioneered by Haynes (2010)
to challenge Nye’s static state-centered approach and introduce transnational religious
actors (TRAs) into the project of soft power, thereby advancing the concept of religious
soft power. Religious soft power refers to an endeavored influence exerted by one side to
facilitate or discourage performances of the other through demonstrating the legitimacy
and necessity of religious identities, norms, and values. As Haynes (2016) famously
articulates, “the idea of ‘religious soft power’ involves encouraging both followers and
decision makers to change behavior because they are convinced of the appropriateness of
a religious organization goals”. A concept encompassing many consequential elements
from culture, state identity, attractions, policies, to institutions, it opens the window of
opportunity for scholars to examine the intersection of identity formation, religious beliefs,
and foreign policy, elements that are perceived as disconnected if not completely mutually
exclusive through the lens of traditional hard power.
Buttressed by this conceptual revolution, scholars in this vein begin to dive deep
into the TRA groups with the hope to examine their orientations, operational mechanism,
and influences. Without the material inducement or military coercion, TRAs wielding
religious soft power often rely on two claims to attract like-minded groups. First, they
emphasize religion’s capacity of salvaging its followers long-oppressed or marginalized
by either secular regimes or another religious majority, deriving ideational and normative
attractiveness from believers’ crises of identity and representation. Second, they point
to the urgent human rights concern such as Afghan refugees and argue that the Grotian
moment has arrived for the religious community to uphold universal moral principles and
transfer the political status quo fundamentally, modeling themselves the only appropriate
solution indispensable for the wide-reaching and imminent crisis. After establishing a
broad and solid audience base to generate the bottom-up momentums in political, economic,
social, and cultural arenas (Bean 2014), TRAs can also infiltrate into the policy-making
procedure and persuade secular leaders to “incorporate religious beliefs, norms, and values
into foreign policy” for the top-down religious influence, as demonstrated in scholars’
examination of Islam-informed foreign politics in Middle Eastern states and the Balkans
(Öztürk 2020, 2021; Mandaville and Hamid 2018; Ciftci and Tezcür 2016; Haynes 2021;
Tarusarira 2020). This top-down and bottom-up religious soft power can further translate
into an accountability mechanism applied by both the state and religious non-state actors
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(RNGOs) to reinforce transparency, responsibility, and liability in multinational coalitions
and global governance (Steiner 2011).
From altering monolithic perceptions of actors in IR to introducing the mechanism of
attraction, religious soft power doubtlessly makes a substantial contribution to ongoing
theoretical debates on political power and religious influence on domestic and international
politics. However, a close examination of this concept sheds light on three major drawbacks
that undermine its explanatory capability. First, religious soft power is a mere attempt to
assemble two established and stylized concepts—TRAs and soft power—thereby rendering
itself relatively ambiguous and undertheorized (Kearn 2011; Haynes 2021). Not only
does it fail to specify the distinct and unique dimension of soft power developed under
various religious contexts, but it also surprisingly overlooks mechanisms, strategies, and
tactics used by religious actors to attract others to meet certain expectations, leaving the
process-level dynamics unclear and underexamined for the specific co-opting procedure.
The intriguing question of why and how the TRAs choose and wield religious soft power
is still not sufficiently addressed. Second, as Kearn (2011) insightfully discerns, the model
of attraction or endearment underlying the religious soft power argument suffers from
three key flaws. On the one hand, while religious soft power comprises both passive
influences of preferences and values through persuasions and active “manipulat[ion] of
the agenda of political choices” and outcomes (Nye 2004, p. 7), attraction theory often
omits the latter and increases the risk of “conflating . . . the use of soft power with the
attractiveness of specific policies” (Lukes 2005), thereby undermining the conceptual
integrity and predictability. On the other hand, as the model of attraction implicitly
brings forward a positive connotation and attitude toward religious actors, scholars may
overlook the Janus faces of the TRAs, which are not necessarily the forces or either good
or evil but can contain both benign and malign influence simultaneously. Additionally,
the process of attraction is relational and context-sensitive which involves both leading
actors and influences recipients/receivers. Complex interdependence and confrontations
among actors with different levels of agency and autonomy often result in various two-way
socialization, cultural appropriation, assimilation, and complete imitations, all of which
fall on the sophisticated “spectrum” that cannot be fully captured by the simple model
of attraction (Bloomfield 2016). Third, similar to soft power, religious soft power faces
the same difficulty of demarcating material resources from their ideational counterparts,
thereby blurring the line between itself and conventional hard power. As globalization
“elides borders and challenges identities (and privileges) tied to place” (Lake et al. 2021),
the rise of unconventional violence and warfare alter our knowledge of military might
and economic capacity, while the world witnesses the securitization discourse, ideology,
culture, and national identity, symbolizing the gradual hardening of traditional soft power
elements. Once the TRAs begin to acquire more hard power in the post-secular world,
whether religion can still remain under the category of soft power is subject to further
debates and discussion, let alone the conceptual legitimacy and applicability of religious
soft power.
To sum it up, albeit scholars’ active attempts to relocate religious factors back to
analysis through extending the soft power concept to include transnational religious
actors, the innovative yet still burgeoning concept of religious soft power suffers from the
underdeveloped religion–power relation, the problematic mechanism of attraction, and the
ambiguous boundary between itself and hard power. It is therefore theoretically promising
to conceptualize the process of the application of religious soft power and to specify
motivations, contexts, mechanisms, and tactics of relevant actors, who endeavor to alter
the outlook of international politics and foreign policies. As detailed in the next section, an
effective yet often overlooked method to further scrutinize and enrich religious soft power
is to integrate international relations with political sociology, a field long intertwined with
IR, remaining a valuable source of alternative theories, perspectives, and methods.
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3. The Three Dimensions of Religious Soft Power: Performative, Discursive,
and Relational
While IR repeatedly emphasizes its academic independence as a distinct branch of
social science, it seldom denies the intimate connection to sociology. Just as Weber (2001),
Marx and Engels (1967), and Durkheim (1965) who strived to “search for order in the
broken fragments of modernity”, their counterparts in IR exemplified by Waltz (1979),
Wendt (1999), and Cox (1986) also try their utmost to unravel the underlying rule of
domestic and international societies (Benjamin 1999). The common goal of exploring the
fundamental order enables the young IR discipline to turn to sociology for conceptual and
theoretical inspirations. Specifically, the famous Waltzian concept of international hierarchy
and anarchy takes roots in Durkheim’s investigation of organic and mechanic solidarity
and social order associated with the advancement of modernity, although scholars have
long debated whether Waltz has mismatched and “misappropriated” these two pairs of
concepts (Lawson and Shilliam 2010; Rosenberg 2013; Griffiths 2018). The analogous theory
production and borrowing of the shared language of disciplines result in a wide-reaching
sociological imprint on the groundwork of IR paradigms, ranging from structural realism
to constructivism. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War facilitates the “third debate” of
IR and witnesses the impulse of supplementing the dominant positivism with various
sociology-oriented methods such as critical theory, social constructivism, and reflexivism
(McSweeney 1999). Further presented by the penetration of sociology in IR, according to
Lawson and Shilliam (2010, p. 681), are three valuable analytical perspectives: “classical
social theory, historical sociology, and Foucauldian analysis”. Given these theoretical,
ontological, and methodological legacies, it is reasonable to argue that a sociological revisit
and extension of religious soft power warrants our attention.
Power is a central, subfield- and discipline-organizing concept in sociology, and as
a result, the way in which theorists parse, typologize, conceptually delimit, or otherwise
comprehend power has consequences for empirical research and the truth claims that
result from it (Reed 2013, p. 195). A concept that “stands out as one whose definition is
particularly contentious and unstable” (Poggi 2006, p. 464), power has instigated a century-
long theoretical debate in sociology, which unfolds into four consecutive stages. Weber’s
definition of power as “chances of” a group of actors to actualize their “own will in a social
action even against the resistance” of other participants marked the beginning of the first
stage, which was characterized by the multiplicity of definitions (it includes three similar
concepts of power, authority, and domination) (Weber 1946, 1978). The conception of power
pioneered by Dahl (1957), Dahrendorf (1958), and Parsons (1963) centered around two
predominant categories: the empowerment model, which interpreted power as absolute
capacity enjoyed by certain actors, and the domination model, which perceived power as
relational influences exerted by the advantaged haves over the subordinate have-nots (Reed
2013). After the initial specification of scope and context, scholars entering the second stage
demonstrated strong interests in sources of power. A systematic summary of sociological
theories along this trajectory can be found in the work of Lukes (1975), who traced the
development of Dahl’s (1957) first dimension of power (pluralistic decision making as
the single source), Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) two-dimensional sources to include both
decision-making and non-decision-making scenarios, and his third dimension of ideation
and subjectivity as the source of power. The second stage of power also includes struc-
turalist factors, which also have an impact on contemporary power discussions, such as
functional separation of powers (Chen 2020), exchange and power (Jessop 1969), and state
power (Skocpol 1979). The three-dimension model was further modified by Scott (1996)
and Poggi (2006), who recognized the political, economic, and ideational/normative power.
Even more groundbreaking and widely acknowledged were ideological, economic, military,
and political powers developed by Mann (1993), or the IEMP mechanism. The third stage
presented the Foucauldian understanding of power, which emphasized its autonomy and
agency and constituted the fourth dimension, providing scholars with a more complex
puzzle hinging on the intersubjective perception and mutually constitutive relations be-
Religions 2021, 12, 940 7 of 23
tween powers, agents, structures, and discourses (Foucault 1980). The fourth or the current
stage of discussion featured the work of Reed (2013, 2020), who interpreted power as the
capacity of “making something happen”. The power–causality matrix consequently sheds
light on the dimensional understanding of the single source of power, which comprises the
performative, discursive, and relational components.
Consequently, this section applies the three-dimensional typology to the religious
soft power with the aim to explore the scope, weight, and means of applications of each
dimension. Mechanisms, actors, and influences of the performative, discursive, and
relation religious soft power are elaborated in detail and summarized in Table 1 at the end
of this section.







constitute identity and selfhood
maintain agency and ontological security
reinforce legitimacy and representation
discursive (understanding of
and making of claims)
scenario framing/interpretation
revise the language of politics (identity, preference,
and interests)
political culture constitution
narrative of state of emergency
shift the burden of proof to the opponents
shape collective interests, identity, and
framing of a political entity
relational (positionality and
structural embeddedness)
insiders of a community:
gatekeeping
monopolize the standard of normality








material: unequal distribution of
resources, privileges, and capacities
results in tactical and strategic
advantages and disadvantages
normative: shape the perception,
cognition, imagination, and identity of
actors embedded in the structure
3.1. Performative Dimension of Religious Soft Power
The performative dimension of religious soft power refers to the actions and practices
of an actor who engages in certain behaviors, carries out the process, and delivers the
outcome of particular events. While performance often incorporates both discourses
and practices, it emphasizes more the latter and pays more attention to application and
actualization rather than the substance of a claim or proposal, prioritizing the procedure
of “walking the talk”. In other words, performance entails the procedure to rationalize
discourse and claims proposed by actors, who engage in various practices of making ideas
intelligible and acceptable to the recipients. The outlook of a performance manifests in two
contradicting ways. First, actors can choose to engage in a regulatory repetition of certain
“historically contingent” actions, which are originally neutral with no specific purpose
but gradually become naturalized, fixated, routinized, and even ritualized through this
repetitive performance of actions, which in turn brings certain facts and influences into
existence (Austin 1979; Butler 1993; Campbell 1998; Braun and Clarke 2019). The “hidden
and insidious” practice can evolve into habits, customs, and rules among participating
actors and communities, who begin to take the performance for granted and follow the
logic of appropriateness to follow suit and comply (Reed 2013). Second, the performance
can make a groundbreaking and norm-challenging theatrical scene. A sudden deviation of
every day’s mundane routines carried out by a group of actors can ridicule the status quo
and generate alternative realities, which alter the repertoires of meaning for the audience
to contemplate and interpret (Alexander 2006; Schechner 2004). Since performance is also
context-sensitive, the temporal and spatial order matters for the outcome and effectiveness
of a performance (Reed 2013). Achronological actions can precede fundamental revolutions,
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whereas a single sparkle in various states has the ability to spark a prairie fire across
the globe. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that whether the performance comes out
successfully does not necessarily have an influence on its effectiveness. A triumphant
performance faces the risk of being overlooked and marginalized, whereas the miscarriage
of an attempted practice may become the martyr that encourages a fundamental change in
the long run.
In general, a performance encompasses key stages of actor presentations, message in-
stantiation and communications, and audience receptions. These scenarios in turn advance
three specific mechanisms applied by transnational religious actors to expand their sphere
of influence. First, actors’ presentations can take place both frontstage and backstage.
Whereas the former features the formal, instant, and direct interactions between specific
actors and audiences, the latter concentrates on the informal, diffuse, and indirect commu-
nications delivered by the institution or the social structure. In frontstage performance,
actors deliver personas and messages designed by the script with the help of the physical
setting (Goffman 1959). They can work on “appearance, conduct, and expressions [they]
give and give off” to emphasize the realness and genuineness of the performance, thereby
establishing a resonance between the scene and past experience of the empathetic audience,
who consequently demonstrates recognition and support of actors (Cook 2013). Under
the classic typology of power by Barnett and Duvall (2005), close and direct connections
between performers and the audience equip the former with compulsory power over the
latter. Second, backstage without established subjective characters and physical props and
scenery, actors derive their ability to persuade through the institutions they belong to. For
instance, a Christian pastor after his or her Sunday mass is still a representative of the
Church and the religiosity. Key messages and principles can still be disseminated through
certain “dress, speech patterns, and body language” (Cook 2013), which symbolize col-
lective identities and norms of institutions and communities. Third, since religious actors
exist both as performers and general audiences, they can facilitate the localization and
socialization of religious norms delivered by the performers. On the one hand, believers in
the audience can emphasize common sufferings and experiences between performers and
the local community, shaping the external religious principle as a useful method to rein-
force the legitimacy and efficiency of local authorities (Acharya 2004). On the other hand,
religious actors can highlight peer pressure, social opprobrium, and status competitions
faced by the audience, who strives to obtain the ingroup identity and often finds the cost of
rejection too high in the socialization process. Compared to the instant compulsory power
exerted by the frontstage and backstage performance, audience infiltration gives religious
actors considerable structural and institutional power to influence the community through
diffuse processes (Barnett and Duvall 2005).
Performative religious soft power shapes outcomes of domestic and international
politics through three approaches: constituting identities and selfhood, maintaining the
agency and ontological security, and reinforcing legitimacy and representation between
actors and the audience. To begin with, the ontological existence and identity of a subject
derive more from the “stylized repetition of acts” than “a founding act” (Bell 1999). The
action of repetition evolves into a particular norm enjoyed by the identity owners, who ex-
tract certain fundamental values from the logic behind the naturalization of this repetitive
procedure. Consequently, repetitive performance as “a sign of power and powerlessness”
advances the principle of difference in relation to which the identity constitutes and grows
into the criteria of selfhood which demarcates the boundary between the insiders and out-
siders, with the former enjoying substantial exclusive rights and privileges (Campbell 1998;
McKinlay 2010). The moral superiority, together with the higher status in the international
society, may further raise the attractiveness of certain identities, whose owners can utilize
and co-opt “B to do something he would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957). Additionally,
following the performative constitution of identity is the performative constitution of
agency and ontological security, which describes agents’ “stable sense of self” and the
subjective understanding of being (Steele 2005; Giddens 1984). Clear identities and rou-
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tinized practice are two sources of ontological security of agents, who need to maintain the
congruence between the subjective sense of selfhood and felicitous actions, and the absence
of either component will lead to anxiety and a sense of insecurity of inaction (Mitzen 2006;
Berenskoetter 2020). Since religious leaders and actors can alter repetitive practices and
redraw the us-versus-them boundary in response to both endogenous ideational contradic-
tions and exogenous systematic change, their performance remains central to ontological
security of the entire community, thereby enjoying considerable agency and autonomy to
alter outlooks of states’ foreign policy. Furthermore, since both secular and religious actors
shoulder the tasks to represent both material interest and normative values of citizens of
nation states, competition for legitimacy and leadership remains a central theme for the
secular–religious contention. The repetitive attempts and claim of defending identities
of the religious minority, restoring equity among the religious haves and have-nots, and
ensuring efficiency in adequate problem resolutions strengthen religious leaders’ ability
to control the hearts and minds of the audience. When believers sense potential threats
to both their survival and ontological security, they will gravitate to the religious sector,
which “performs agency through the securitization and establish [itself] as the designated”
representative (Braun and Clarke 2019), thereby marginalizing the secular counterpart,
whose policies fail to protect from faith-based principles.
3.2. Discursive Dimension of Religious Soft Power
While the performative dimension concentrates more on practice repetition and ac-
tualization of claims on the macro level, the discursive dimension in contrast zooms into
the process level and prioritizes the understanding of and making of claims. Owing its
popularity largely to Foucault (1980), discourse describes the system in which meaning,
perception, conceptualization, and ideas of certain subjects are addressed and delivered
in a certain way to explain, predict, and prescribe relative actions in the reality, which
further functions as contexts to constitute and influence the operation of the entire sys-
tem. Core elements of discourses are the creation of meaning and knowledge, the system
of signification, and “discursive productivity” (Milliken 1999). Cognitive discourses are
the ones specifying existence, ontological status, and content of factual and social reality.
They are responsible for clarifying the frontier of know-how and drawing the boundary
between the perceived and unexplored knowledge, thereby known also as the birthplace
and repository of meaning. The establishment of factual and physical reality is followed
by the normative construction of meaning, which matches material realities with value
judgments. The process behind this normative discourse is the system of signification
that categorizes subjects according to different signs, “written or oral, visual or auditive”
(Epstein 2008). Normative discourses place realities to the system of signs for classification
and often present dichotomous categories—imaginable versus unimaginable, natural ver-
sus constructed—which implies a power asymmetry that “privileges . . . one element in
the binary” (Derrida 1981). In addition to its descriptive and explanatory aspect, discourse
contains a distinctive element of productivity and constitution. On the one hand, it can
scrutinize the methodology, ontology, and epistemology of individuals, society, and even
the entire human beings. The control of the “habitual way of society thinks” advances
the creation of common sense, or “naturalized” subjects which are taken for granted,
“evacuated with historical contingency . . . [without] alternative meanings” (Epstein 2008;
Bourdieu 1983). On the other hand, the monopoly of meaning-creation and naturalization
of reality and statements further equips discourse with the power to identify the qualified,
knowledgeable, and authorized “subject to speak and to act” (Keeley 1990). Not only do
discourses obtain the right and power to write the rules, norms, and values, but they can
now determine who have the right to produce and execute these “standards of normality”
(Weber 1998), thereby preserving the right to interpret, maintain, transform, and abolish
the physical and social realities.
How does discursive religious soft power contribute to foreign policy change? First,
religious actors can rationalize their impetus of policy change through an interpretation
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of incidents in hand, shaping the scenarios into an architected reality that tilts the power
balance toward their side. When religious actors are entrepreneurs of purported normative
shifts, they can start by criticizing the infelicitous “situated creativity” and temporal
dimension of the normative status quo and undermine the legitimacy and authority of
local institutions (Reed 2013). The emergence of a catastrophic crisis is so “radical and
damaging” to the status quo that it constitutes a Grotian moment that both accommodates
the systematic change and justifies the departure from the entrenched norms (Bloomfield
2016). These state-of-emergency arguments thus enable religious actors to legitimately
suspend the normal procedure and shift the psychological and evidentiary burden to
the antipreneurs, who need to either successfully dilute the sense of imminence or find
alternative approaches for crisis resolutions.
Second, religious actors can generate an innovative language of politics to reflect the
reorientation of both ideational/normative factors and the material interests of the entire
religious community. When observing the fluctuation in the international system that
presents either material or ontological threats to their members, religious leaders have
emotional and discursive power to not only capture “realities of revolutionary changes
and conflicts” but also shape the audience’s perceptions of who they are and what issues
and stakes they should pursue and compete around (Chryssogelos 2021; Hunt 1984).
Consequently, it is not surprising to experience the insurgence of a hawkish and militarized
position for a conventionally dovish religious group privileging international humanitarian
development which now “wake[s] up to the . . . danger of [another] bloody, brutal type of
religion and the clash of civilization” (Baumgartner et al. 2008). The public opinions can
further be translated into the outlook of foreign policy when the government pays special
attention to the constituents to either fulfill the campaign promise or accumulate electoral
support for incoming elections.
Finally, political language “emerged, elaborated, and interpreted” by religious dis-
course can exert considerable influence on the political culture of nation states (Baker
1990). One of the most distinctive examples is the evangelical footprint on US fundamental
foreign policy: American isolationism and exceptionalism. The city-upon-the-hill discourse
in the founding myth reinforces the identity of the United States as “qualitatively different
from other nations” due to its allegiance to liberty, dignity, and equality (Amstutz 2013).
It further frames this difference into a state of exceptionalism, which exempts the US to
participate in international affairs and follow the shared rulebooks, gradually resulting
in the US Isolationism that continued into the early twentieth century. This discourse of
exceptionalism also enters the sphere of political morality, which attempts to “demonstrate
to the world the habits, traditions, and values that contributed to the prosperity, liberty, and
human dignity of American society” (Amstutz 2013). The moral traditionalism and the us-
versus-them evangelical worldview gradually evolve into the pursuit of a universal moral
principle of liberty, democracy, and human rights, which account for the substantial annual
budget allocated to the USAID, a foreign policy pillar often subject to partisan conflicts.
3.3. Relational Dimension of Religious Soft Power
Unlike the performative and discursive dimensions, which advance the property con-
cept of power as possession of resources and acknowledge considerable agency acquired
by actors in face of structural constraints, the relational dimension asserts that actors never
operate in a vacuum and highlights embeddedness and positionality of actions in struc-
tured social relations. In a heterogeneous world entailing agents with different material,
ideational, and normative capabilities, there exists a hierarchy that centralizes dominant
actors and marginalizes newcomers with insufficient material and ideational resources
and discourse power. Consequently, actors rooting in various relations face two major
structural influences and constraints. First, the unequal distribution of resources, privileges,
and capacities among different positions provides certain tactical and strategic advantages
and disadvantages for felicitous agents at a particular spot. For instance, the working class
residing on the peripheries experienced substantial exploitations under the traditional
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capitalist system, which allocated capacity and domination to the bourgeoise that enjoyed
the disproportional privileges in the scope, weight, domain, cost, and means of power exer-
cises (Baldwin 2016). Second, in addition to material constraints, the dichotomous structure
stressing the disparity and cleavages between the haves and the have-nots often suppresses
the self-perception, cognition, and imagination of the latter, thereby depriving their nor-
mative resources and capacities. As Lukes (1975, p. 27) famously elaborates, a predatory
structure with “the supreme and most insidious exercise of power prevent people . . . from
having grievances shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way
that they accept their role in the existing order of things”. In order words, naturalizations
and standardization of inequality and dispossession of the disadvantaged participants
animate both external and internal entrapment of these agents, whose constrained daily
practices and discourse further maintain and reinforce the entire system.
While positions of agents are multidimensional and should be best described as a
flexible spectrum, their roles can usually fit in three categories: insiders of a community,
rising newcomers, and principle-agents, each of which receives various distinctive strategic
and tactical advantages to shape the policy outcome. Insiders of a community often enjoy
substantial institutional, material, and discursive advantages in shaping the outcome of
events. In Haynes’ (2013) categorization of transnational religious actors, the insider group
corresponds to extended religious actors, which have usually established a concrete and
well-developed transnational network and institution and demonstrated expansive interest
in political, social, and cultural arenas. As exampled by the Roman Catholic Church, which
remains a central insider of the global Catholic society, insiders of a community often
occupy the gatekeeper position to monopolize the standard of normality and legitimacy
and demarcate the line between us and them. They also enjoy substantial institutional
advantage to accelerate or slow down purported policy change or even abolish and suspend
the regular decision-making procedure.
In contrast, rising newcomers, or negotiated religious transnational actors in Haynes’
(2013) category, often lack the sophisticated cross-border base and strive to form the
monolithic, “strong, and federated institutional structure” (Levitt Peggy 2004, p. 8). Rising
newcomers striving for insider identities pay special attention to socialization and norm
localization. With the intention to demonstrate their positive attitude toward universal
norms and principles, negotiated RTAs exemplified by Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) and many other
Muslim groups can either develop subsidiary norms to bridge the discrepancy between
universal requirements and local realities or establish subsidiary local institutions that
endeavor to “integrate followers into powerful, well-established, cross-border networks”
monopolized by the extended insiders (Levitt Peggy 2004; Acharya 2011). They also serve
as key channels to deliver and consolidate the bottom-up influence of local entities to the
central government, which faces pressures from both the extended and negotiated RTAs
and must take faith-based opinions into consideration.
The principle-agents category may be the most familiar group under the church-
state binary that dominates modern international relations. Corresponding to state-linked
transnational religious actors in Haynes’ (2013) analysis, religious actors in this category
have no intention to monopolize legitimacy and authority by excluding their secular
counterparts. Instead, they acknowledge material and normative resources and expertise
possessed by states, which are the dominant and experienced participants and vehicles in
international affairs. In other words, state-linked RTAs choose the state government as
their agents to advance the religious influence for the global community. There are two
major approaches applied by religious actors. On the one hand, they can form interest
groups, advocacy organizations, and electoral constituencies to advance religious interests
and preferences in election politics. The religious identities of the congressional caucus, the
cabinet of the presidents, and the supreme court justices can also leave religious footprints
in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, three channels of religious influence into
the foreign policy. On the other hand, the decentralized, bottom-up structure of religious
organizations and institutions can also constitute the civil religion, or “the integration of
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religion with public life” (Amstutz 2013). This theology of national political faith further
advances the politicization of religion and the religionization of policy making, resulting in
the deep intertwine of secular and religious realms of identity, preferences, and interests
reflected in domestic and international politics.
4. Evangelicals and US Foreign Policy under the Bush Administration (2001–2009)
To examine the applicability and rigor of the typology above, this section applies
the three-dimensional religious soft power mechanism in the post-9/11 George W. Bush
administration, which channeled substantial influence of the conservative evangelicals
that emphasized dissemination of religious freedom and protection of human rights,
thereby contributing to the initiation of US Global War on Terror and the passage of
a series of congressional bills on international humanitarian aids and interventions. It
begins with a brief review of the religiosity and composition of evangelical groups in
the US. Understanding their identities, stakes around which they compete for, and their
preferences, it moves on to analyze the performative, discursive, and relational soft power
obtained by evangelical communities and actors, which engaged in various operations to
advance military actions against radical Islam and global human rights campaign, two
pillars of the US foreign policy formulated under the Bush administration, whose legacy
continued to shape the outlook of the US’ participation in international affairs for another
two decades.
4.1. The Evangelicals in the US: Who Are They and What Do They Want?
Often believed as the single largest religious group in the US, American Evangelical
emerged in the eighteenth century as a branch of the Protestants. Its contemporary con-
figuration dated back to the early 1940s, when New Evangelicalism returned to orthodox
Protestantism in the face of the fundamentalist movement’s overt disengagement and
pietism (Amstutz 2013; McMahon 2006). While scholars and pollsters have discerned
denominational membership, self-identification, and religious beliefs as three ways to
distinguish the evangelicals, the identity of this distinctive group remains flexible and
slippery and is consistently mixed up with political conservatives and the Religious Rights
(RR). Nevertheless, the evangelicals share a common belief in four core principles. First, the
absolute priority and authority of the Scripture result in the textualist reading of the Bible,
which lays down fundamental ethics, morality, and the way of life. Second, recognizing
the sacrifice of Jesus Christ functions as a way for individuals to personally connect to and
reconciliate with God. Third, the salvation of God enables believers to redeem their sins
and convert to be born-again Christians. Finally, individuals shoulder the responsibility to
proactively disseminate the good news (euangelion in Greek) or gospel to the entire world
(McGrath 2015; Bebbington 1989; Amstutz 2013).
The four pillars of the evangelical belief system and worldview—textualist biblicism,
“crucicentrism” (Bebbington 1989), proselytization, and individual–God connection—thus
bring forward two fundamental doctrines that define their material and normative stakes
and guide their actions. On the one hand, the evangelicals pledge allegiance to the preser-
vation of their spiritual citizenships. Fully aware of their ontological existence in both
earthy nation states, “city of man”, and the spiritual Christian kingdom, “city of God”,
evangelicals remain unsatisfied with “sin and human greed” embedded in secular gov-
ernances, which often attribute social dilemmas to structural forces instead of individual
responsibility and performance (Amstutz 2013). The explicit contradiction to the “account-
able individualism” principle that underlies individual–God commitment, therefore, calls
for the restraint on state governance. Small governments unable or unwilling to ensure the
wellbeing of the believers should transfer authority and rights to their spiritual counterpart,
which instead advances the rule of “soulcraft as statecraft” in social engagements (Shah
2009). On the other hand, since individuals remain key agents of God to actualize salvation
and redemption across time and space, the evangelicals following the pietist tradition
attempt to advance the universal defense and salvation of human dignity and personal
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religion by upholding moral traditionalism. Without the ambition to advance the global
“moral transformation” (Mouw 2011), strict and textualist biblical interpretations neverthe-
less result in the monolithic and fundamentalist moral matrix hinging on human rights,
liberty, and justice. The moral superiority and religious exceptionalism thus demarcate the
boundary between us and them. Any diversion from the moral orthodoxy is considered
as pariahs so detrimental to the existence of evangelicalism that must be targeted and
salvaged, even through the use of violence.
As demonstrated above, the religious identity of the evangelicals has left this group
with two constant ambitions: to search for adversaries and enemies advanced by the
narrative of securitization and to monopolize the making and execution of normative
principles endeavored by the expression of moral supremacy. Needless to say, at the end
of the Cold War that presented both a series of ethnoreligious humanitarian crises and
the unipolar moment in which the US enjoyed unprecedented autonomy, domination,
and discourse power, the outbreak of terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, prepared
the evangelicals with the felicitous moment to manufacture alternative realities to set the
faith-based agendas, infiltrate three branches of US governments, and proselytize religious
principles to rally the audience around the flag through various performances.
4.2. “No God in Common”: Evangelical Discursive Soft Power
Before the airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the evan-
gelicals preoccupied with their triumph over the secular evil, the Soviet Union, had just
embarked on another search for adversaries. While long aware of discrepancies between
their religiosity and Islam, they did not formulate official, full-scale, and explicit anti-
Islamic polemics and discourses until 9/11. These sudden, unprecedented, and existential
threats designed by an overlooked religious other provided members of the evangelical
community with a precise moment to occupy the moral high ground and declare the
antagonism with this novel religious evil. The first step was to reexamine cleavages and
incongruences between these two religiosities to establish the knowledge foundation of
the apologetic narrative. Evangelicals often start with a literal reading and comparison of
the Bible and the Qur’an. As exemplified in Geisler and Saleeb’s (1993) Answering Islam,
the textbook of evangelical apologetic literature, Islam demonstrates a polemic toward the
priority of the Scripture, the resurrection and crucifixion of Jesus, and Christian teachings.
Whereas these two religiosities contain different interpretations of overlapping compo-
nents, the evangelicals find no “redemptive analogy” to establish the common ground
between these two religiosities (Richardson 2003; Cimino 2005). Further alarming the
evangelicals are the antagonism and hostility exhibited by excerpts of the Qur’an toward
Christianity. For instance, Surah 5 and 9 of the Qur’an record the waring of Allah toward
the Muslims to “take not the Jews and Christians for friends . . . slay the idolaters [infidels]
wherever ye find them. . . . Fight against those who . . . believe not in Allah nor the Last
Day” (Hunt 2003). The explicit militancy and constant prescription of fighting enable the
apologetics to conclude that Islam is characterized by the innate and habitual embracement
of violence. To further elevate the convincingness and trustworthiness of their framings,
the evangelicals sometimes turn to the former Muslims, who experienced conversions and
are familiar with principles of both religiosities. Testimonies of this group, as exemplified
by Unveiling Muslims, constitute a significant component in modeling Islam into a violent
other, which not only discriminates “followers of Moses and Christ as children of Satan,
not separated brethren” but also embraces jihads as an “essential and indispensable tenet”
(Caner and Caner 2002; Cimino 2005).
Irreconcilable differences between peace-loving selfhood and cruel unorthodox pre-
pare the evangelicals to engage in the secondary narrative: constructing the evil perpe-
trators. On the one hand, the evangelicals perceived Islamic extremists participating in
the planning and execution of 9/11 as the “space of objects”, rendering Islam militancy
and jihadism well-acknowledged and meaningful to the general audience (Epstein 2008).
The exceptionalism and lone-wolf characters of these terrorists were further reduced in
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the public speeches of the evangelical leaders, who repeatedly emphasized that “terrorists
were not some fringe groups that changed the Koran to suit political ends. They knew the
Koran quite well and followed the teachings of jihad to the letter”, rendering terrorists
into symbols to both blur the line between “good Muslim” and “bad Muslims” and signify
the violent nature of the Muslim community as a whole (Caner and Caner 2002). On the
other hand, after constructing and reinforcing the collective memories and common sense
of Islam as a synonym for terrorism, the evangelicals further placed special emphasis on
their identity as victims representing all oppressed populations around the globe. Islam as
a sign of end-times recorded in the Bible symbolized the catastrophic moment that left the
evangelicals with no choices but spiritual warfare as the only appropriate and available
option. The special subject position as delegate and agent transferred the alienation of
Islam to the criminalization of this “evil and wicked religion . . . with Muhammad [as] a
terrorist” (Baumgartner et al. 2008), thereby justifying the evangelical proposal of salvation
and restoration of justice through probable military crusades to counter abuse of power by
the adversary.
Further legitimizing its purported self-defense narratives, the evangelicals continued
to escalate the instant victim–perpetrator relation into a manufactured, secularized, and
systematic clash of civilization, hinging on the barbaric narrative embedded in orientalism.
To rally people around the flag, they first turned to the ontological and existential threat
to the “city of man”. The national security discourse was exemplified by the address
of the Society of Americans for National Existence (SANE), an extremely conservative
group arguing that “adherence to Islam as a Muslim is prima facie evidence of an act in
support of the overthrow of the US. Government through the abrogation, destruction, or
violation of the US Constitution and the imposition of Sharia on the American People”
(Haddad and Harb 2014). Similar concerns about religious freedom and human dignity
were expressed by President Bush’s 2001 statement: “They hate our freedoms: our freedom
of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with
each other . . . These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of
life” (Bush 2001a). Islamophobia and outrage expressed in these narratives short-circuited
the rational judgment of the general public, which believed in the demonized image of the
barbaric other and displayed no empathy and effort to challenge the constructed reality.
Additionally, as the evangelicals interpret 9/11 as an Islamic attack on the West as a whole,
they disseminated anxiety and fear across national frontiers. To counter the “axis of evil”,
a term coined by the Bush’s evangelical speechwriter Michael Gerson, the US and its
allies set the agenda to defend and promote “a global spread of what the president sees
as God-given rights”, especially religious freedom, democracy, and human rights, which
constituted the new language of politics (LaFranchi 2006).
Needless to say, the evangelical discourse of “no god in common” has altered the
public perception, sentiment, and reaction to Islam as a religious other. Pew center dis-
covered that 62% of evangelicals and 44% of non-evangelicals in the US remained vigilant
to their drastic differences with Islam in 2001. The number of people unaware of the
religious antagonism decreased from 31% to 22% from 2001 to 2003, when more than 70%
of evangelicals perceived Islam as “a religion of violence” in 2003 (Pew Research Center
2001; Ethics and Public Policy Center/Beliefnet 2003; Cimino 2005). The discursive soft
power of the evangelicals in 2001 continues to leave footprints in the US public. Two
decades after the tragedy of 9/11, 50% of Americans still perceive Islam as the main source
of violence and terrorism, which is twice the number in 2002 (25%) (Pew Research Center
2021). The anti-Islam thrust in the public memories laid down the foundation for the
evangelicals to expand their webs into branches of government, thereby exercising their
relational soft power.
4.3. Politicked Crusade in Political Branches: Evangelical Relational Soft Power
Albeit the First Amendment of the US Constitution explicitly demands the separation
of church and state, the evangelicals are never strangers to the executive, legislative, and
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judicial branches. The current configuration of evangelical penetrations dated back to
the passage of the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), which established
the Office of International Religious Freedom under the State Department, the US Com-
mission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) within the Congress, and a special
advisor of international religious freedom (IRF) to the National Security Council (NSC).
The evangelicals thus occupy key positions within these branches and possess substantial
institutional resources and privilege to advance their agendas, concerns, and interests
in the policy-making procedure, “as evident as anywhere in the words and deeds of the
current Bush Administration” (Wessner 2003).
Unlike the US Supreme Court that had since hosted only one evangelical supreme
justice, the legislative branch experienced the persistent evangelical influence on the
constituency. As demonstrated by Table 2 and Figure 1, the percentage of evangelicals in
the congress increased 3.4 points from 1961 to 2021, and evangelicals experiencing a drastic
increase constituted 13% of congressional membership during Bush administrations (Pew
Research Center 2021). Moreover, the year 2001 witnessed an explicit alignment between
partisanship and religious identity, with 61% of White evangelicals identifying with the
republicans. Coalitions between the general public and legislators inside consequently
contributed to the formation of a determined constituency and electoral group, which
comprised various interest groups and lobbies ranging from the Family Research Council
to the Christian Coalition. In response to the reorientation of evangelicals’ identity and
interests after 9/11, “conservative Christian churches and organizations have broadened
their political activism from a near-exclusive domestic focus to an emphasis on foreign
issues” (LaFranchi 2006). When 78% of White evangelicals casted their votes to Bush in
his re-election and accounted for 23% of the total electorate (Pew Research Center 2004;
Cady 2008), the head of state under substantial pressure had no means to circumvent his
campaign promises, which emphasized the necessity and legitimacy of the Global War on
Terror, a war parallel to the Cold War that excepted the similar triumph of the US in face of
the evil Islam. Ensuring that the state would not hunker down and remain reluctant to put
the boots down in the Middle East, evangelical groups exploited the textualist reading of
the Bible, emphasizing that the Land of Israel was promised to Jewish people by God. As
the Christian Zionism fostered an evangelical-Jewish coalition in the elections, it prepared
the evangelicals to “be the most effective constituency influencing a foreign policy since
the end of the Cold War” (Brownfield 2002; Salleh and Zakariya 2012).
Table 2. Percentage of evangelicals in the US Congress (1959–2023).
Congress Years Number ofEvangelicals Total Members Percentage
87th 1959–1961 62 532 11.70%
91th 1969–1971 53 534 9.90%
96th 1979–1981 56 533 11.30%
101th 1989–1991 56 535 10.50%
106th 1999–2001 73 534 13.70%
111th 2009–2011 73 534 13.70%
112th 2011–2013 70 535 13.10%
113th 2013–2015 82 533 15.40%
114th 2015–2017 82 535 15.40%
115th 2017–2019 86 535 16.10%
116th 2019–2021 84 534 15.70%
117th 2021–2023 80 531 15.10%
Source: Pew Research Center, https://www.pewforum.org/2021/01/04/faith-on-the-hill-2021/ (accessed on 6
August 2021).
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I a iti to the bot o -up pressure echanis , the evangelicals identified four
l ci f irect influence ithin the executive branch: the president, bassadors at Large
f r I , special advisors in the NSC, and IRF-related special envoys and representatives
( nited States issi I t r ti l li i ). t e latter
t l established in the bureaucracy until the 2016 Frank Wolf Act signed
by President Ob ma, the former two indeed provided sufficie t institutional space an
advantages fo religious actors. Both amba sadors at large ad inistration
ere evangelicals ith previous leadership in churches and organizations. The very first
bassador Robert Seiple was the president of World Vision I ternational with prio ities in
evangelical international humanit rianism and developments, and the second ambassador
John Hanford serve as the pastoral minister of the West Hopewell Presbyterian Church for
fourteen years (Chandler 1986; Bettiza 2019). Their wide connections and human resources
thus prepared a channel for “evangelical Christian leaders to arrange sessions with senior
White House aides” (Page 2005), thus injecting evangelical values and preferences in the
annual report analysis and the identification of “countries of concerns” conducted by the
state department. Further expanding evangelical spheres of influence were the identity
politics and evangelical president style upheld by President Bush, who attributed his
successful election and re-election largely to the evangelical constituencies. Perhaps the
only President after Carter to repeatedly express his commitment to evangelicalism in
public scenarios, Bush was never shy about showing off the close relationship between
religion and politics, which was also a religious vocation in his eyes (Berggren and Rae
2006). “There is only one reason that I am in the Oval Office and not in a bar. I found faith.
I found God. I am here because of the power of prayer” (Frum 2003). Staff familiar with
the “predominant creed” of the White House recalled Bush organizing various bible study
groups inside the executive branch, and “opening every cabinet meeting with prayer and
insisted on a high moral tone” (Frum 2003). The intrusion of religion into politics resulted
in his intimate relations with both domestic and international religious leaders. One of
the most surprising examples in his religious connections was British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, the “first Prime Minister since Gladstone to read the Bible habitually” (Rentoul
2001). Bush had explicitly admitted the relational influence of his evangelical identities
on the formation of political alliances: “Tony is a man of strong faith. You know, the key
to my relationship with Tony is he tells the truth, and he tells you what he thinks and
when he says he’s going to do something, he’s going to do it. I trust him” (Bush 2003).
As the US president, Bush found himself positioning at the intersection of the bottom-up
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demand for “answer[ing] the attacks and rid the world of evil” and the transnational call
for “a crusade after all” for human dignity (Bush 2001b). It was therefore not surprising to
find the strong coalition between the US and its allies in the 2001 War in Afghanistan and
2003 Iraq War along with strong executive momentums behind the passage of a series of
presidential acts to address human trafficking (2000), ethno-religious conflicts in Sudan
(2002), and human rights atrocities in North Korea (2004), all of which witnessed the
tri-sector collaborations between the evangelical churches, President Bush, and US allies
with evangelical constituencies.
4.4. The Multi-Theater Repertoire: Evangelical Performative Soft Power
A multi-staged theater for the evangelicals to control the public interpretation of and
response to crisis formulated when terrorists challenged the US way of life and freedom.
The frontage stage performance took place during the evening of September 11 when
President Bush delivered a national address loaded with religious elements through the
television. The choice of television as the performance channel was a wise move to
strengthen the actor–audience connection. The visual imaginaries of plane debris and
ordinary heroes saving and helping others displayed a clear contrast between evil and
good to instigate grief, fear, outrage, and demand for justice among the general public. A
shared identity, “we the people” as American, began to emerge when the audience “see
themselves in the collective representations that are the materials of public culture . . .
[thereby] acquir[ing] self-awareness and historical agency” (Hariman and Lucaites 2003;
Murphy 2003). After viewers familiarized themselves with the general plot, President Bush
as the protagonist began to add flesh to the bone with his epideictic speech. The opening
line—”our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series
of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts”, with the “deliberate and deadly” echoing with the
depiction of the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor in the famous “Days of Infamy” speech
by President Roosevelt—signified a major and sudden disruption of repetitive practice
that defined the ontological existence and uniqueness of Americans. The introduction of
biblical language, Psalm 23, intended to provide a psychological and spiritual comfort to
the traumatized people, whose peace, dignity, freedom, and justice had been disfranchised
by “evil, the very worst of human nature” (Bush 2001c). The issue at hand, as interpreted
by Bush also in his prayer and remembrance service at the national cathedral on September
14, was not a sporadic misfortune but a premeditated attack, “an adversity that introduces
us to ourselves . . . as the God’s sign” (Bush 2001b). Consequently, as the Bible often told,
the US as a chosen nation with chosen people were obliged to stand up against the absolute
evil and defend the biblical moral and ethics across the globe, thereby establishing religious
legitimacy for the upcoming wars against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Also worth noticing was the evangelical communication style and emotions of the
main actor that spiced up this scene. Famous for his “calmness, certainty . . . and emotional
intelligence” derived from his firm belief in God’s will (Berggren and Rae 2006), Bush
appeared frowning with concerns on the scene. Despite his sincere sadness, there was no
voice trembling or tearing up but only strong equanimous deliberations with confident
hand gestures, assuring the audience that the imminent crisis ought to be addressed by
a reliable and decisive leader, who determinedly claimed: “My faith frees me. Frees me
to put the problem of the moment in proper perspective. Frees me to make decisions
that others might not like. Frees me to do the right thing, even though it may not poll
well” (Bush 1999). As later recalled by the observer of the decision making regarding
the Iraq War, “Bush’s faith offers no speed bumps on the road to Baghdad; it does not
give him pause or force him to reflect . . . but [remains] a source of comfort and strength”
(Klein 2003).
It was evangelical leaders backstage that worked hard to sustain influences of visual
imaginary, epideictic rhetoric, and evangelical policy-making style applied at the frontstage.
Presidents of religious organizations and high priests from prestigious churches enjoyed
considerable public image and media outreach and can reinforce the good–evil narrative
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and interpretation through their authority and legitimacy. Whereas television evangelist
Pat Robertson publicly labeled Islam as “the demonic . . . and satanic power . . . worse
than Nazis [that] motivate crazed fanatics”, Franklin Graham, the son of the respectable
religious leader Billy Graham, accused “Islam as an evil and wicked religion” (Puskar 2006;
Baumgartner et al. 2008; Robertson 2002; Mizner 2011). Performance of demonization was
also carried on by the leader of the Southern Baptist Church Jerry Falwell, who expressively
announced that “I think Muhammad was a terrorist” (Baumgartner et al. 2008). In addition
to the top-down announcement, rank-and-file religious leaders also strived to embed
this anti-Islam thrust into the everyday practice of masses, seminars, and bible studies.
Local churches functioned as captains to both localize and politicalize national religious
messages. Integrating regional realities and drawing a line between strict Bible reading
and conservative policies advanced by Republicans, evangelical leaders not only produced
the “sacred expression of” policy agendas of evangelical politicians but also cast a spiritual
significance to the performance of voting, which became a core element of the civil religion
(Bean 2014). The religionization of politics was exemplified in the interview with a deacon
of Northtown Baptist Church, who testified that “if you listen to the message of the sermons,
I believe they are right on with the conservative aspect of the Bible . . . As far as how it
relates politically, it is very important to me to vote for a conservative-thinking candidate”
(Bean 2014). Backstage performances both in the hall of power and in daily life resulted in
the effective audience socialization that rallied congregations around the flag with ease
through Christian nationalism. The bottom-up evangelical momentum to shape foreign
policy was famously displayed in 2004. Unsatisfied with Bush’s soft response to Palestine,
Falwell and Robertson bombarded the White House with over 500,000 emails, which soon
exhibited a more hawkish attitude to defend “Israel’s unilateral disengagement plan in
Gaza” (Nabers and Patman 2008).
5. Conclusions
How does religion interact with international relations? This essay approaches this
question by re-examining the underdeveloped concept of religious soft power. Through an
interdisciplinary attempt to integrate IR with political sociology, it challenges the mono-
lithic view of power and proposes a three-dimensional religious soft power model, hinging
on its discursive, performative, and relational faces. The applicability and theoretical
rigor of this model are tested in the process tracing of the evangelicals’ “no god in com-
mon” discourse, politicked crusade in both legislative and executive branches, and the
multi-staged performance of the anti-Islam repertoire. All these efforts in turn rendered
into discursive, relational, and performative influence on the Bush administration, which
structured its foreign policy around two evangelical faith-based pillars: international hu-
manitarian assistance and the Global War on Terror. Through enumerating mechanisms,
strategies, and tactics applied by the evangelicals to the Bush administration, this article
attempts to provide an operational account of the exercise of religious soft power, whose
application procedure is often hard to trace due to its subtle nature. Without overthrowing
the current realism–liberalism–constructivism paradigm, it demonstrates that religion, a
distinctive factor often marginalized or acquiescent with reluctance by students of inter-
national relations, indeed obtains chances and conceptual rigor to fight its way back in
this discipline, especially in the post-secular world that animates re-contemplation of the
Westphalian–Enlightenment assumption of international affairs.
Advancing the multi-dimensional understanding of religious soft power, this essay
is fully aware of several limitations that may undermine the explanatory and predictive
power of this model. First, despite scholars’ ceaseless effort to clarify the scope and context
of this term, religious soft power still suffers from conceptual ambiguity, given the slippery
nature of its key components—religion and soft power. Until scholars can accurately
demarcate hard power from soft power, whose nature is undergoing significant changes
under globalization, technological innovation, and epistemic revolution, religious soft
power remains a debatable concept subject to ceaseless criticisms. Second, the small-N
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nature of the research based on the qualitative method without the support of significant
quantitative data resulted in the limited external validity of the three-dimensional religious
soft power model. Third, whereas this essay positions religion under the constructivist
paradigm hinging on identity, values, and norms, the empirical analysis demonstrates
that religious actors value both material interests and normative principles, with the
former aligning more with the realist and rational institutionalist arguments. In fact, the
US evangelicals were “neither as self-serving as some realists presume nor as aloof to
international social dynamics as rational institutionalist and liberal scholars commonly
allow” (Mantilla 2017). Theoretical monism and “methodological fundamentalism” bring
forward the problematic gladiatorial logic, leaving no space for paradigmatic innovations
(Fearson and Wendt 2002; Checkel 2012).
Whereas this essay positions religion around power, there exit various key concepts
in IR that can become anchorages for religion analysis, including but not limited to norm
entrepreneurship and antipreneurship, states’ compliance with faith-based international
human rights law and humanitarian law, religion and state building, spiritual warfare, and
secular–religious competition for international order making and global governance. As we
enter the third decade of the twenty-first century under a multipolar, bipolar (US-China),
and even a nonpolar system, religion remains central to the functioning and dysfunction of
the liberal international order, which has long functioned as both context and source of
IR theoretical paradigms. Whether current IR theories and concepts will sustain to host
religion remains a key question for future researchers.
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